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The Reorientation of the Initial Project of the Philosophy of the Will 
 
We know that the development of the philosophy of the will did not go as Ricœur had 
planned. The Philosophy of the Will, as Ricœur conceived it in his 1948 thesis, was originally 
supposed to connect the eidetics of the will to an empirical study of the passions and the fault, 
which finally would have been followed up by a "concrete mythics” emerging from a poetics 
of the will.1 Such a long-term project takes time, so it is not surprising that the second volume, 
which itself is divided into two books, appears ten years after its announcement. What is a little 
more surprising is that, along the way, the project was radically revised and modified. In fact, 
we can recall that in the actual development of his Philosophy of the Will, Ricœur would extend 
the pure description implemented in the first volume to the first book of the second volume, 
Fallible Man, while the empirics of the passions will be replaced by a hermeneutics of the fault 
dedicated to the interpretation of the symbols of evil, constituting the second book of the second 
volume, The Symbolism of Evil. This latter book, however, gives up – but without explicitly 
stating it – the prospect of a poetics of the will in relation to what Ricœur called 
"Transcendence." In fact, Ricœur is silent about this enigmatic "revolution at the very center of 
my self"2 that was announced in his thesis, which would have allowed him to no longer restrict 
the opening to transcendence as an alienation, as an abandonment of one’s fundamental 
freedom. 
"The Foreword" to Fallible Man opens quite naturally with this change of perspective. 
Ricœur acknowledges that the reasons for making a detour through a “concrete mythics”3 has 
[4] appeared in the meantime, along with the complications caused by this detour, such that "the 
methodological questions"4 have dominated the development of the book, according to its 
author. It is worthwhile to stop there, in order to understand the link between myth and 
imagination mentioned in the title of this chapter.  
 
A Detour Announced by the Deciphering of Myths 
 
The first reason for the detour is that it appeared to Ricœur that the passions and the 
fault do not lend themselves to any description, even empirical, insofar as their “encoded” 
language5 is already the language of myths. Although he does not indicate it, but as can be seen 
in reading the 1947 books that are devoted to Karl Jaspers, it is indeed with Jaspers that Ricœur 
found this conception of philosophy as deciphering non-philosophical myths that are an 
inexhaustible resource of thought. The following excerpt from the book on Jaspers and Marcel 
attests to this: 
  
[For Jaspers] the theory of ciphers marks the stage entrance of myth in the philosophy of 
existence. When Jaspers asserts that faith is not an imperfect knowledge, the faith of which 
he is dreaming is not oriented towards dogma as in G. Marcel, but towards myth. Myth is 
not a provisional approximation of knowledge, but the ultimate resource by which the 
philosopher can still speak about transcendence. Philosophy becomes a universal myth 
where art, religions and philosophies regain their truth as a cipher.6 
 
Ricœur therefore abandoned the empirical study that he had initially projected, and 
forced himself to justify the introduction of a "mythics into philosophical reflection"7 – without, 
however, mentioning hermeneutics8 – because the myths of evil cannot be constituted for 
philosophy as raw data, as is the case with the history of religions. In the 1953 essay to which 
he refers his readers in a footnote, the philosopher thus sought to prepare a welcome ground for 
the "myths of the fall, chaos, exile, and divine blindness," which consists in reconstructing "the 
universe of discourse" from which these myths are drawn:  
 
It then appeared that myths could only be understood as secondary elaborations of a more 
fundamental language that I call the language of confession; it is this language of confession 
that speaks to the philosopher of the fault and evil; for this language of confession is 
remarkable in that it is through and through symbolic; it does not speak of stain, sin, and guilt 
in direct and proper terms, but in indirect and figurative terms; to understand this language 
[5] of confession is to implement an exegesis of the symbol that calls for rules of deciphering, 
that is to say, a hermeneutic.9  
 
The study to which the philosopher refers his reader, entitled "Tragic Guilt and Biblical 
Guilt," 10 actually constituted a test beyond Finitude and Guilt. It is actually an essay of 
comparative mythology, where the narrative of guilt in Greek tragedy11is confronted with its 
figuration in the biblical myth of origins recorded in Genesis. It is worthwhile to dwell on this 
point, because Ricœur applies the concept of the "phenomenological reduction" to the Biblical 
and Greek religious symbols:  
 
The application of the comparative method to Greek myths and Hebraic myths is 
conditioned by the neutralization of the act of faith that could eventually be reattached  to 
these myths bu a redeeming act that concerns me, which concerns us; the election of Israel, 
the Creed of the Christian Church concerning the second Adam undergo a sort of 
phenomenological reduction by which the transforming intention that goes from the pagan 
myth to the Hebrew myth is retained, but without the historian taking part; the myth 
retained in its structure and in its intention thus becomes a meaningful cultural phenomenon. 
This methodological artifice – because it is an artifice, like all the sciences practice when 
developing their 'object' – henceforth allows a homogeneous comparison of myths in terms 
of a single phenomenology.12 
The phenomenological reduction evoked here seems to be synonymous with the 
suspension of assent, an epoche in the Husserlian sense of the word. By affirming that the 
prerequisite for the comparative study of myths is the suspension of the act of faith whereby 
the subject could reconnect the myth to an act of salvation – whether the latter derives from the 
Christian faith or the Dionysian pagan religion –, Ricœur formalizes a methodological rule that 
is essential to the hermeneutics of symbolic language that he is undertaking. It should also be 
noted that if the act of faith is suspended, belief is lived through but yet "in a neutralized mode": 
far from being inconsequential, this distinction seems to us to express the whole difference 
between the scientific attitude, concerning which Ricœur says elsewhere that it "proceeds from 
a certain 'reduction' of our total relation to the world; only one aspect of the world is retained: 
its quantitative and measurable aspect”13, and the phenomenological attitude. Indeed, if it is 
enough to suspend all faith in the reality evoked by religious myths in order to study them 
scientifically, it is necessary, in order to propose a phenomenological analysis of them14, to be 
open to the religious intention expressed by the symbols and narratives that employ them. 
Ricœur explicitly says this on the first page of the introduction to The Symbolism of Evil 
(entitled "The Phenomenology of Confession"), [6] when he calls for "a repetition in imagination 
and sympathy" of the confession that the religious consciousness makes of evil:  
 
If the 're-enactment' [répétition] of the confession of human evil by the religious 
consciousness does not take place in philosophy, this confession nevertheless belongs 
already within its sphere of interest, for this confession is a word, a word that man pronounces 
about himself; every word can and must be recovered in the element of philosophical 
discourse. We will soon say what the philosophical site, if you will, of this 'repetition' is, 
which is already no longer a religious lived experience and which is not yet philosophy.15  
 
If it is conceivable that the phenomenological repetition of the confession is no longer religion, 
why is it not yet philosophy? Because all that comes from philosophy is a conceptual approach 
to evil which asks, what is "the human place of evil, its entry point into human reality"?16 
 
An Anthropology of Fallibility: The Ethical Vision of the World 
 
This search for a conceptual approach is the reason why the detour through a 
hermeneutic of the symbols of evil is itself preceded by an "outline of a philosophical 
anthropology"17 :  
 
This study focuses on the theme of fallibility, that is, the constitutional weakness that makes 
evil possible; through the concept of fallibility, philosophical anthropology comes to 
encounter the symbolism of evil, just as the symbolism of evil brings myths to 
philosophical discourse; through the concept of fallibility, the doctrine of the human 
approaches the threshold of intelligibility where it is comprehensible that through man evil 
has been able to 'enter the world'; beyond this threshold begins the enigma of an emergence 
concerning which there is nothing but indirect and encrypted discourse. Just as the 
symbolics of evil represented an extension of the mythic that the Freedom and Nature 
proposed, the theory of fallibility represents an expansion of the anthropological 
perspective of the first work which was more narrowly focused on the structure of the will.18  
 
The above excerpt offers the second of the reasons why Ricœur amended his initial project. 
Before arriving at an interpretation of the symbols of evil, it was still necessary to move from 
the polarity of the voluntary and the involuntary to the broader polarity of finitude and infinitude, 
which in fact opens the study of Fallible Man, and that Ricœur, again, had tested in a number 
of previous studies that are cited in footnotes.19 It is indeed the function of a [7] "reflexive 
thought" to constitute a concept of fallibility designating "the possibility of evil"20, before the 
mythical language about its entrance into the world is interpreted. Ricœur already signals to his 
reader that the hermeneutics of the symbols of evil is not "homogeneous" with such a reflexive 
philosophy, insofar as it will require the invention of "rules of transposition [...] into a new type 
of philosophical discourse,” which will be done in the conclusion to Finitude and Guilt - "The 
Symbol gives rise to Thought" - which is in the eyes of the author "the pivotal point of the 
whole work."21 Thus a hiatus exists, on the level of method, between a pure reflection and a 
philosophical hermeneutic, since it will be a question of "both respecting the specificity of the 
symbolic world of expressions and of thinking not 'behind' but ‘starting from' the symbol”, that 
is to say, of preparing for the empirics of the servile will anticipated by his thesis.22  
This is where the philosopher announces – his experience, however, should have led 
him to be more cautious! – a “third part, which will be published in a later volume [...] entirely 
devoted to this thinking that starts from the symbol.”23 In this announcement painted in broad 
brush strokes, it is clear that this third volume would have been more directly devoted to an 
"empirics of the servile will", which would engage psychoanalysis as well as criminal law, 
political philosophy – and in a general manner, the social sciences.24 This announcement, once 
again, was a bit too risky since there would not be a third volume devoted to thinking starting 
from the symbol of the servile will, no more than there was a third volume offering a "concrete 
mythics" back to back with a poetics of the will. However, there was a deeper engagement than 
initially foreseen with the question of psychoanalysis, which led to Freud and Philosophy 
(1965), as well as a mixture of hermeneutical tests of great importance collected in The Conflict 
of Interpretations (1969), which do offer segments of a poetics of will, as we will try to show.  
Let's return to the hiatus mentioned a little bit earlier, in order to say that the pure 
reflection implemented in the first part of Finitude and Guilt is paradoxical in that it moves 
toward a philosophical interpretation of the symbols of evil by using the only resource that is 
available to the philosopher, that of the "ethical vision of the world", but a resource which 
cannot suffice however. This is why Ricœur does not hesitate to disorient his reader by stating 
that to designate the stakes of Fallible Man, he could have "chosen for the subtitle of this book: 
The Grandeur and Limits of an Ethical Vision of the World.”25 This involves going all the way 
through to a mutual understanding of evil and freedom; the grandeur of pure reflection is 
precisely to "try to understand evil through freedom"26 by leaving behind any speculation about 
other sources of evil than human freedom. Ricœur stands [8] firm on this point: “the humanity 
of the human is, in any case, the space of manifestation of evil.”27  
It is important to be aware of the specificity of this vigorous entry into the matter: here 
the first word is up to philosophy, in this case, to ethics. The affirmation of freedom therefore 
has a primacy over religious discourses that have denounced human guilt since time 
immemorial.28 The philosopher is the one who, invariably, honors the background of goodness 
of human freedom which is more fundamental than its deviance, and who at the same time 
relentlessly calls humans to responsibility. The philosopher is a moralist for whom there is only 
one conceivable freedom: a "freedom that recognizes itself as responsible, that vows to take 
evil as evil committed and confesses that it depends on freedom for evil not to be.”29 This 
entrance into the question of evil through human freedom is already recognized by Ricœur to 
be at work in Kant’s "Essay on Radical Evil,” where "through formalism, evil tends to be 
reduced to a maxim of the free will."30 Note that Ricœur writes "tends to be reduced": in the 
ethical approach to evil initiated by Ricœur in the wake of Kant, "it is very possible indeed that 
the human is not the radical origin of evil, that he is not the absolute villain." But immediately 
afterwards, Ricœur clarifies: "Even if evil were contemporaneous with the radical origin of 
things, it would remain the case that it is manifest in the way it affects human existence.”31 
So this is the indelible grandeur of the ethical vision of the entrance of evil into the 
world. But Ricœur also has as a project, as we have seen in the introduction of Freedom and 
Nature, of accounting for the unavailable nature of freedom, servile freedom. He has not 
forgotten it, and reiterates in the preface of Fallible Man that "the enigma of the servile will", 
the enigma of a “free will that binds itself and finds itself always already bound, is the ultimate 
theme that the symbol gives to be thought.”32 In the debt that he intends to honor with regard 
to Jean Nabert,33 Ricœur has found an additional reason to arrive at a philosophical reflection 
on the servile will. Indeed, Ricœur asserts that he has drawn from the reflexive philosopher a 
meditation that is the reverse of the one he draws from Kant. This Nabertian meditation never 
ceases to "broaden and deepen the doctrine of freedom under the sting of the evil which, 
however, it has taken back into itself," to the point that with Nabert, one may understand that 
“in an ethical vision, it is not only true that freedom is the reason for evil, but the confession of 
evil is also the condition of the consciousness of freedom."34 It is particularly in a "difficulty" 
with Nabert’s Essay On Evil that Ricœur sees the link with the theme of the servile will:  
 
[9] If Evil is [as Nabert maintains] 'the unjustifiable ', can it be fully reiterated in the 
confession that freedom makes of it? This difficulty is one that I encounter in another way, 
in the symbolics of evil. The main enigma of this symbolics is that the world of myths is 
already itself a broken world; the myth of the fall which is the matrix of all subsequent 
speculations concerning the origin of evil in human freedom [...] leaves outside itself the 
rich mythics of chaos, of tragic blindness, and of the exiled soul; even if the philosopher 
wagers on the superiority of the myth of the fall because of its affinity with the confession 
that freedom makes of its responsibility, even if this wager allows all the other myths to be 
regrouped with the myth of the fall as their center of reference, it remains that [...] the 
exegesis of the myth of the fall directly leads to the appearance of this tension between two 
meanings: on the one side, evil enters into the world insofar as the human posits it, but it is 
only posited because the human cedes to the adversary's investment. The limit of an ethical 
vision of evil and of the world is already signified in this ambiguous structure of the myth 
of the fall: by positing evil, freedom is in the grip of an other.35 
 
The link between the difficulty evoked by Ricœur and the theme of the servile will is 
not easy to discover. One indication would be the discreet critique of Nabert in this excerpt, 
which could be made explicit by the more candid one that Ricœur proposes at the end of a 
glowing book review entitled "L’Essai sur le Mal de Jean Nabert.”36  There he regretted 
Nabert’s tendency to identify evil and finitude, insofar as the fact of being finite and having to 
choose ultimately seems for him to be the equivalent of evil itself.37 Despite his assent to the 
book as a whole, Ricœur reaffirms, after L’Essai de Nabert, "that it is a task of the philosophy 
of evil to distinguish between evil and finitude."38 He reiterates all the value he grants – along 
with Nabert himself, and also with Kant – to the assertion of a fundamental difference between 
the original affirmation, good in itself, by which the subject posits itself in being, and the 
preference of this same subject for itself to the exclusion of any other. In other words, the 
affirmation of a freedom that may or may not do evil is in principle different from a passivity 
experienced in doing it: everything happens as if, in freely choosing to do evil, I was actually 
only giving in to it. It is precisely the lesson of the symbolism of evil that Ricœur anticipates at 
the end of his foreword, as usual. The broken character of the mythical field evoked here is due 
to the fact that the affinity of the biblical myth of the fall with the discourse of ethics (evil is 
the fruit of freedom) does not prevent other myths from depicting a form of exteriority of evil 
towards the human. The real development of the symbolic will show that this exteriority 
originates in the symbol of the stain, which was not completely eliminated from the biblical 
symbol of guilt (or: from the Genesis narrative). 
[10] Here we have arrived at the center of our proposal: our hypothesis is that the exercise 
of pure reflection implemented in Fallible Man is based in part on the power of the 
representation of innocence in the biblical myth of origins. 
 
Pure Reflection on the Originary: The Power of the Imagination 
 
Fallible Man, as has been noted, is situated on the threshold of a hermeneutic of myths 
and symbols of evil. But the introduction of the mythical in the philosophical reflection 
announced by Ricœur’s Foreword begins long before The Symbolism of Evil. Already with 
Fallible Man, the central theme of the mythical, the imagination of innocence, appears at the 
core of the analyses derived from pure reflection. Here is a particularly striking example, which 
occurs in the analysis of affectivity: 
With the affective closure, we recover the feeling of the original difference between myself 
and every other; feeling good or bad is feeling my singularity as inexpressible and 
incommunicable; just as one’s place cannot be shared, the affective situation in which I find 
myself and feel myself cannot be exchanged. It is here that egoism, as a vice, finds its 
opportunity: out of difference, it makes a preference. But the preference for oneself, inherent 
in all inclinations, is what the Stoics called an attachment to oneself, an original tendency to 
want good for oneself, a love of one’s own constitution, that I would readily call a love of 
oneself as a point of view.39 
Ricœur asserts the point forcefully: if I can come to give myself preference over the whole 
world, it is first because I am constitutively carried by a desire to be which, in itself, is good. In 
particular, I am a being who is naturally led toward self-love. Our hypothesis is that the place 
of the myth (and thus of the imagination) is inscribed in these analyses deriving from pure 
reflection, insofar as these analyses are all pointing toward the state of innocence through its 
constant betrayal in our fallen being. 
 
The Innocent Nature of Man: Ricœur in the Footsteps of Rousseau  
 
Of course, Kant already evoked, as the first "original provision to the good in human 
nature", "the physical and simply mechanical self-love" by which the human being emerges 
from animality.40 But Kant himself owed this idea to Rousseau who, first and much more 
strongly, had issued a plead for a morally neutral "love of self", because it is the expression of 
[11] a natural will for self-preservation.41 If Ricœur, like Rousseau, does not hesitate to speak 
about self-love rather than attachment, like the Stoics, it is because he represents the self-love 
of the human being as the trace of a lost innocence that the mythical narrative of Genesis lets 
us imagine.42 Ricœur also tends to identify this state of innocence with the affirmation of an 
original goodness of the human being. Rousseau, as we know, affirmed the natural goodness of 
man even though he never ceased to denounce the wickedness of human society. In an important 
1952 essay devoted to the "revival of non-philosophy through philosophy,"43 Ricœur comments 
on the book The Philosophy of Existence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1952) by his friend Pierre 
Burgelin. It presents what he considers to be "Rousseau's stroke of genius, which coincides with 
the wound of his life and perhaps with the crack of his psyche":  
 
To have identified guilt and socialization. This stroke of genius began the modern 
philosophy of history. Philosophy is no longer meta-physics but meta-history: it is 
necessary to pierce through the fact of sociality up to what is beyond our history, up to this 
natural goodness which is both our innocence and our nature. [...] The rich and informed 
power of innocence and the wickedness of the limited achievements of history do not 
belong on the same level; they are like an overlaying [surimpression].44 
By secularizing the biblical myth of the fall and by identifying evil as the entrance into 
sociability and history, Rousseau regains the intention of the myth, which is to indicate the point 
of passage from the state of innocence to that of civilization, since it is clearly stated that after 
the fall work (with all its painfulness) will form the daily life of humans (Genesis 3, 17-19). 
Natural human goodness remains nonetheless; it is unavailable but yet present at the heart of 
social being. Here Ricœur finds the opportunity to credit Rousseau with a schema, that of 
"overlaying", which is in reality his own, since it was already present in his thesis:  
The fault is understood as a lost innocence, as a paradise lost. The objection is therefore 
right to deny us any direct description of innocence. Yet it is not the lost paradise of 
innocence that we are claiming to describe, but the structures that are the fundamental 
possibilities offered both to innocence and the fault as the common keyboard of a human 
nature on which mythical innocence and empirical guilt play in such different ways.45 
 
When he develops this schema of overlaying ten years later, in The Symbolism of Evil, 
Ricœur pays homage to Rousseau, in close proximity to Kant:  
This is what Rousseau brilliantly understood: the human is 'naturally good', but we know 
the human under the regime of civilization - that is to say, of [12] history - only as 'depraved.' 
Above all, that is what Kant understood with admirable rigor in his Essay on Radical Evil: 
the human is 'destined' to the good and 'prone' to evil. This paradox of 'destination' and 
'inclination' concentrates the entire meaning of the symbol of the fall.46 
 
The proximity between Rousseau and Kant should not, however, give rise to an 
identification between them, insofar as the notion of respect for the person, which forms the 
synthesis of character and happiness in Kant,47 is based in the final instance on an ethical 
dualism "where the duality of good and evil is already constituted and where man has already 
chosen the side of evil.”48 In short, one finds in Kant a "pessimistic anthropology dominated by 
the theory of radical evil,"49 while pure reflection on fallibility requires another anthropology 
than one which is already situated "in the circle of fallenness."50 It is a question of seizing the 
possibility of failing and not the actuality of evil:  
 
We have no other access to the origin than through the fallen; in return, if the fallen does 
not give an indication of that from which it has fallen, no philosophy of the original is 
possible and one cannot even say that man is fallen; for the very idea of fallenness involves 
a reference to the loss of some innocence that we understand enough to name it and to 
designate the present condition present as a gap [écart], a loss, or a fall.51 
 
In an analysis resulting from pure reflection, the right to represent innocence through 
fallenness is undeniable from the methodological point of view, as one can see in the above 
passage. Yet, it is clear that this research itself already bears the imprint of a philosophical 
reading of the myth of Genesis. In other words, Ricœur implements in pure reflection a form of 
philosophical imagination which is conceptual in nature and which assumes (without directly 
justifying) a particular reading of the biblical myth that conceives innocence as what endures 
through and in spite of the fall – hence the schema, so fecund, of the "overlaying" of original 
goodness and historical wickedness. From the point of view of what religion gives philosophy 
to think, the power of the imagination is held there, in the call that is sent to the philosopher by 
the myth of origins to conceive an intrinsic goodness of all human acts, which is always 
denatured and betrayed. The Ricœurian anthropology of Fallible Man, in particular, is directed 
toward the original mode of human being, while highlighting the mistakes and deviances which, 
from a pragmatic point of view, characterize the practical modalities of its being. In this regard, 
Rousseau’s influence seems to outweigh the considerable influence of Kant: with the latter, 
who is also heavily influenced by Rousseau,52 [13] Ricœur pays the utmost attention to the 
disfigured aspect of the human passions, but with the former, he constantly intends this original 




From Fallen Figures of Self-feeling to the Restoration of the Original 
 
The central passions studied by Kant’s practical anthropology, relating to possession 
[Habsucht], domination [Herrschsucht] and honor [Ehrsucht], 53  will provide a place for 
Ricœur’s masterful study of having, power and valuing, before they become disfigured. Under 
the heading of "affective fragility,"54 the philosopher proposes a "philosophy of feeling," in 
which the feeling of the self can be understood starting from appropriation (having is necessary 
to be a subject), the effort of civilization against nature (power is at first only a differentiation 
of functions for this purpose) and the desire for recognition that each one addresses to others 
(value aiming first toward the esteemed character of the self as a human being, as an end in 
itself). In studying these specific forms of the desire to be human, Ricœur’s intention is clearly 
aimed toward the original state of these constituent modalities of the affective being as having, 
power and worth,55 all the while also seeing in them the opportunities to fall:  
 
Kant places himself immediately in front of the fallen figures of human affectivity; the 
Sucht of each of these passions expresses the modality of aberration, of delirium, under 
which they enter into history; an anthropology elaborated from a practical point of view 
is undoubtedly justified in doing so [...] But a philosophical anthropology must be more 
demanding; it must proceed to the restoration of the original that is at the root of the fallen; 
just as Aristotle describes the perfection of pleasure beyond all forms of 'intemperance', 
we must recover, behind this triple Sucht, an authentic Suchen [...] the quest of humanity 
[...] constitutive of human praxis and the human self; we must proceed in this way, 
because even if we only empirically know these fundamental quests under their disfigured 
and hideous face, in the form of greed, the passions of power and vanity, we understand 
these passions in their essence only as perversions ...; it must even be said that what we 
understand, first of all, is the primordial modalities of human desire and constituents with 
regard to the humanity of the human; and then we understand the 'passions' only as a gap 
[écart], deviation, fallenness, from these original quests. This understanding of the 
original first and the fallen second, starting from and through the original56, undoubtedly 
requires a kind of imagination of innocence, the imagination of a 'reign' where the quests 
of having, power and worth would not be what they actually are; but this imagination is 
not a fantastic dream; it is an 'imaginative variation,' to speak like Husserl, which 
manifests the essence, breaking the prestige of the fact.57 
[14] In this passage, the expression "restoration of the original" refers to the description 
of the original modality of human affectivity, made possible by an imaginative variation of a 
phenomenological nature. At the same time, as is often the case with Ricœur, there is a term of 
biblical provenance, suggesting a community of insight between the philosophical imagination 
and the biblical imagination: "The imagination of a 'reign'," understood as the reign of God that 
the evangelical parables evoke in many ways ("The Kingdom of God is similar to...”). The 
theme of power will also bring Ricœur to clarify this biblical allusion, since he will write a little 
later about: “the utopia of a Kingdom of God, a City of God, an empire of minds, or a kingdom 
of ends, implies an imagination of a non-violent power. This imagination releases the essence, 
and this essence regulates all efforts to actually transform power through the education of 
freedom."58  
For Ricœur, imagination is already in power: the philosophical imagination allows us 
to conceive the original through the fallen, the mythico-poetic imagination offers a figuration 
of original innocence as innocence regained; the utopian imagination invites within history the 
courage for concrete action – and, of course, the theme of utopia will be the subject of important 
developments later on. Distinguished by their modalities, these three aspects of the imagination 
are rejoined in their ability to liberate the essence of its empirical achievements: the original is 
thus the indication of an understanding of the factual and historical, depending on whether it is 
envisioned as what fundamentally is, what is originally, or what is yet to come. 
In every way, the origin is what grounds essences but factual reality does not know. It 
is absent from actual human history since human history always already moves within the 
empirical realm of the passions. Only the mythical narrative can figure it, in its naivety – since 
it is prior to the invention of history – which lets it believe in the possibility of designating the 
tipping point where the origin becomes the beginning of history, the passage from innocent 
humanity to real and present humanity. Based on original freedom, without which human 
responsibility would be nothing but a meaningless word, ethics comes too late when it comes 
to observing the passage to the deviant act by which one passes from fallibility to the fault. It 
has already been accomplished, everywhere and always, because the human cannot cope with 
its emotional fragility. This leads to the painful worries about having enough, being powerful 
enough, and being recognized enough.59 Worry [l’inquiétude] is indeed the mode of expression 
of self-feeling: "It is noteworthy,” notes Ricœur, “that the self is never assured [assuré],"60 that 
it is relentless in the quest for what would justify its existence through domination over the 
other. This is indeed a quest for being, in someone whose fragility is constitutive of his or her 
personhood; but this quest is a pathos, for this great fragility only [15] knows – in order to be – 
how to give precedence to its own desire to be over any other consideration.  
Ricœur returns, in conclusion, to this relation between the philosophical imagination 
and the mythical imagination which appears to be representative of his relation to religion in 
this volume, even if it is dedicated to pure philosophy. And this places it definitively on the 
threshold of The Symbolism of Evil :  
Innocence would be fallibility without fault, and this fallibility would be only fragility, 
only weakness, but not fallenness. It does not matter that I can represent innocence only 
by way of myth, as a state realized 'elsewhere' and 'long ago' in places and times that have 
no place in the geography and history of rational man. The essence of the myth of 
innocence is to give a symbol of the original which tran-spires (trans-parait) in fallenness 
and is denounced as fallenness; my innocence is my original constitution, projected into 
a fantastical story. This imagination is nothing scandalous for philosophy; the imagination 
is an indispensable way of investigating the possible; [...] One could say, in the style of 
Husserlian eidetics, that innocence is the imaginative variation that makes the essence of 
the original constitution stand out, by letting it appear on another existential modality; 
[...] I must understand together and as an overlaying [surimpresssion] the original 
destination of 'goodness ' and its historical manifestation in wickedness [méchanceté]; 
however original  wickedness may be, goodness is even more original. That is why, as 
we will see, a myth of the fall is only possible in the context of a myth of creation and 
innocence. If we had understood this, we would not have wondered if 'the image of God' 
can be lost, as if, in becoming wicked, man ceased to be human; nor would we have 
accused Rousseau of inconsistency when he professed, with obstinacy, the natural 
goodness of man and his historical and cultural perversity.61 
 This text is representative of Ricœur’s style in the 1950-60s: long sentences in a row, 
separated only by semicolons – Ricœur was fond of them– which invite a quick reading, in one 
breath, as if each sentence could not make sense without the following one, which nevertheless 
has another, complementary perspective. In the end and in one gesture, the opposites connect – 
here goodness and wickedness, the mythical fable and the eidetic – not by taste or the way of 
the dialectic but because, actually, the original is the index for understanding the fallen, and 
innocence for wickedness. Philosophy only knows this when it listens to the mythical logos 
which it always knew but without ever knowing it, that is to say, without thematizing its own 
discourse. This is perhaps the lesson that will have to be expected from The Symbolism of Evil : 
to aim toward a reflexive state of human knowledge, in this case to reach a philosophical 
awareness of the passage from the original to the fallen, from fallibility to evil. When Ricœur 
announces that the next volume will focus on the "continuous transition of vertigo" that seems 
to lead from the freedom of the human will to the bad will, when he expresses an "ultimate 
paradox" that "evil only proceeds [16] from this weakness because it is posited,"62 he shows the 
tenor of this philosophical hermeneutics that meditates on pre-philosophical discourse, the 
paradoxical nature of the lessons it draws from a logos which, because it is formed out of 
symbols woven together by a narrative, tends to be chronologized in the form of a canvas 
governed by the narrative logic of a before and an after that the philosopher has learned – thanks 
to the myth, but below it – to read as "an overlapping."  
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